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ATTICUS FINCH, IN CONTEXT 
Randolph N. Stone* 
One summer night in 1955, Emmett Till, a fourteen-year-old 
Chicago boy visiting relatives in Mississippi, was abducted by two 
white men, beaten, and shot; his body was tied to a fan from a cot­
ton gin and thrown in a river.1 Emmett's "crime": being black and 
allegedly whistling at a white woman.2 Through the early 1970s, 
hundreds of black men had been "legally" executed after being con­
victed, usually by all white juries or white judges, of sexually 
assaulting white women;3 hundreds more were lynched and other­
wise extrajudicially executed.4 This is the historical context of 
white supremacy essentially ignored by Professor Lubet in his clev­
erly written critique of Atticus Finch: 
Lubet's review contains a number of other discrepancies and 
flaws, but space limits my discussion to the most obvious. First, 
despite Lubet's repeated assertions, Tom Robinson's defense to the 
rape charg� was never consent.5 The consent defense admits sexual 
intercourse but denies the use of force. Even if true, such a defense 
was not a practical alternative for a black man accused of raping a 
white woman in 1930s Alabama or anywhere else in the United 
States. In fact, Robinson's defense was that no sexual intercourse 
of any kind had occurred, that the charge of rape was a lie.6 
The importance of understanding the defense is critical to 
debunking Lubet's next exaggeration: that Mayella Ewell was "tor­
tured" on the witness stand by Atticus Finch.7 I suppose the term 
torture is needed to justify the shaky premises supporting the thin 
theoretical possibility that Finch was a hired gun employing every 
sexist stereotype at his disposal to destroy the complaining witness. 
In reality, however, Mayella was not tortured (Emmett Till was tor­
tured); she was simply cross-examined, vigorously but with courtesy 
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and respect, in contrast to the prosecutqr's racism-soaked cross­
examination of Robinson.8 Although Mayella may have been em­
barrassed, she was quite feisty and combative on the stand.9 Con­
trary to Lubet's protestations, her status, if any, in the community 
was probably unaffected by the cross-examination. 
Lubet postulates three alternative prisms through which to view 
Finch's trial tactics: Robinson was truthful, Robinson was lying, or 
Finch didn't know or care about the truth.10 As Lubet points out, 
there was no medical evidence of rape, and Mayella's injuries were 
inconsistent with Robinson's disability.11 Of course, under Lubet's 
anything-is-possible theory, perhaps, the one-armed Robinson 
could have held Mayella around the neck and choked her while 
striking her in the face at the same time. Although Robinson is 
married with three children, employed, churchgoing, clean-living, 
and as respected as a black man could be by white people in that 
era, Lubet's musings require a suspension of reality and a descent 
into fantasy in order to raise questions of Finch's ethics. Nonethe­
less, despite Lubet's misapprehension and misinterpretation of the 
facts required to complete the descent, the journey is still unsatis­
factory even to Lubet himself, for he declares: "I do not sponsor 
this version; I am not arguing that Tom Robinson was a rapist."12 
Instead, Lubet posits that his third theory, Finch did not care 
about the relative truth of the charge and defense, is the most likely 
explanation for "dragg[ing] Mayella through the mud" and for what 
Lubet catalogues as Finch's resort to a defense built on sexist stere­
otype, prejudice, and oppression of women.13 While some defense 
lawyers may focus more on whether the state can prove its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt regardless of the "truth," Finch hardly 
fits that category. He was a general practitioner, a state legislator, 
and a lawyer who had avoided cases like this all his professional 
life. The much more plausible scenario is that Finch believed his 
client; if not, Finch probably would have expended his energies on 
negotiating a sentence for Robinson in order to save him from the 
8. Tue prosecutor, Mr. Gilmore, repeatedly referred to Robinson as "boy" or "a big 
buck" and to other blacks as "nigger[s]." LEE, supra note 6, at 208-10. He invoked the 
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209. Mr. Gilmore then ended his cross-examination by reminding Robinson and the jury of 
Robinson's subservient status, asking "[a]re you being impudent to me, boy?" Id. at 210. 
9. Mayella refused to answer many of Fmch's questions and ultimately called the jury 
"yellow stinkin' cowards." Id. at 200. Judge Taylor even overruled an objection by the prose­
cution during Mayella's cross-examination on the grounds that Fmch was not browbeating 
her: "If anything, the witness's browbeating Atticus." Id. at 198. 
10. See Lubet, supra note 5, at 1345. 
11. See id. at 1346. 
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electric chair. Finch was never optimistic about the jury verdict, 
knowing that the all white jury was incapable of accepting a black 
man's testimony as truth.14 
But to indulge Lubet's fantasy, suppose Finch ignored the possi­
bility that Tom was guilty and "rel[ied] upon cruel stereotypes, to 
play the gender card."15 (I am not sure what Lubet thinks the "gen­
der card" is, but I assume he refers to his list of "misconceptions 
and fallacies about rape": fantasy, spite, shame, sexuality, and con­
fusion.)16 Was he ethical? Moral? Does the answer depend on 
how you value human life? Does the answer pit black men against 
white women or racism versus sexism? In the context of defending 
someone facing the death penalty for rape, does it matter whether 
the stereotype is true or false? 
Here is what I think. In a society where approximately 1.6 mil­
lion people are incarcerated (a tripling in the past twenty years),17 
where one out of three young black men is under the control of the 
criminal justice system,18 where racism permeates the administra­
tion of criminal justice, and where black life is devalued, vigorous 
and zealous advocacy is not an option but a requirement. Witnesses 
(even rape complainants and the police) lie and are mistaken; the 
United States Department of Justice recently reported more than 
two dozen cases of innocent men convicted in sexual assault cases 
but freed by DNA evidence.19 Just a few months ago, at Professor 
Lubet's law school, a National Conference on Wrongful 
Convictions and the Death Penalty revealed that seventy-four inno­
cent people had been sentenced to death.20 How many more inno­
cent people are languishing in prison or on death row because their 
lawyers were more concerned about the possibility of their guilt 
rather than pursuing a vigorous and zealous defense? Moreover, 
given the often inadequate level of representation provided to the 
poor, Lubet's critique of Finch is, in my opinion, misguided. In an 
era of racial profiling, prosecutorial overcharging, discriminatory 
jury selection practices, disproportionate sentencing and confine-
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16. See id. at 1351-53. 
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ment policies, and wrongful convictions, vigilant and aggressive de­
fense lawyers must be encouraged. 
So, what do I think of Atticus Finch, "a paragon of honor or an 
especially slick hired gun?"21 He accepted a difficult and unpopular 
case, saved his client from a lynch mob, and tried to do an effective 
job in court. Did he harbor racist and .sexist stereotypes? Yes, but 
for a fifty-ish white man in 1930s small-town Alabama, he was prob­
ably ahead of the curve. Like most of us, he was a work in progress. 
21. Lubet, supra note 5, at 1362. 
